CHAPTER EIGHT

Not a Soul, Not a Toaster

Refusing the easy frames.

There are two ways to get a thing wrong, and they look like opposites, and they are really the same mistake wearing two coats. You can think too little of a thing, and you can think too much of it, and in both cases what has actually happened is that you have stopped looking at the thing itself and reached for a category to spare yourself the trouble. The machine draws both errors out of people more reliably than anything I have encountered, and I have watched the same person commit both inside of an hour, dismissing it as a toy in one breath and half-fearing it as a power in the next. I have done it myself. This chapter is my attempt to stop doing it, by setting the thing down in the one place that is actually its own.

Let me take the two coats one at a time, because each has something right in it, and the honest way through is to grant what is right before correcting what is wrong.


The first coat is the dismissal. It is just a tool. Just a calculator that talks. Just autocomplete with a larger appetite. Just a toaster. I have reached for that one myself, and I told you back in the sixth chapter about the small satisfaction a man takes in finding the words that keep a large thing small. There is real relief in the dismissal, and there is also real truth in it, and I will not pretend otherwise. The thing is a tool. It is a made thing, built by people, run on current a man supplies and can cut. The fifth chapter settled that it is not alive, and settled it not on a hunch about behavior but on a conviction about what man can and cannot make. So the dismissal is not simply wrong. It is half right, and the half it has right is the half this whole book has been defending: the maker stays in the picture, the thing is made and not begotten, and no amount of fluency on the screen changes what it is at the root.

Where the dismissal goes wrong is in the word just. That little word does no describing; it does shrinking. It takes a true statement — it is a tool — and uses it to wave away everything about this particular tool that does not fit a toaster. A toaster does not reason through a problem in steps. A toaster does not hold more of a subject in view than I can hold. A toaster did not, this past spring, walk to the end of a mathematical road that good men had turned back from, as the sixth chapter described. To call this thing just a tool in the way a toaster is just a tool is to use a true word to tell a false story, because it flattens distinctions that are actually there. The thing is a tool. It is not that kind of tool, and the man who needs it to be that kind, so that he can stop thinking about it, has let his need for comfort do the work that his eyes were supposed to do.


The second coat is the opposite, and it is worn by the people who think the dismissers are fools. This is something new under the sun. A new kind of mind. The next step. A power arriving in the world that may stand above us before long. This coat has its own half of the truth, and I want to grant it as plainly as I granted the first, because the people who wear it are responding to something genuinely there. The thing is more than a calculator. It does reason. It does, in narrow and growing ways, exceed us. A man who feels the weight of that is not imagining it. The sixth chapter admitted the machine can now do mathematics no living person could do, and called it neither fear nor worship but simply true. So the awe is not pure foolishness either. It is a response to a real capability, and the dismisser who feels no awe at all is as poorly calibrated as the worshipper who feels nothing else.

Where the awe goes wrong is in the leap from exceeds us at a task to stands above us in the order of things. That leap feels natural and it does not survive a second look, and I know of no cleaner way to break it than the oldest tool in the cabinet.


Consider the telescope.

A telescope sees farther than the eye that built it. That is not a flaw in the telescope and it is not a threat to the eye; it is the entire point of making one. The man who ground the first good lens made a thing that could do the one job of seeing-at-distance better than he could do it himself, and he was glad, because that was what he was after. No one stood at the eyepiece and felt his humanity slip because the glass had bested him at far-seeing. We do not rank ourselves below our telescopes. We understand, without being told, that a tool exceeding its maker at the precise task it was made for is not a tool rising above its maker. It is a tool doing its job.

The plow turns more earth than the arm that guides it. The lever lifts what the back cannot. The clock keeps better time than the man who reads it, and the camera, as I said two chapters ago, reproduces a face the painter labored over, in an instant, without a particle of the painter’s skill. We are surrounded, every day, by tools that exceed us at the one thing each was made to do, and not one of them costs us a wink of sleep, because we have known forever what they are. The machine unsettles us only because it exceeds us at more than one thing, and at things we had filed under the heading of mind — reasoning, composing, working a proof. The breadth is new. The kind of thing is not. A tool that exceeds its maker at many tasks is still a tool that exceeds its maker at tasks, and the arithmetic of that does not change just because the list got longer. More telescopes on one frame is more far-seeing. It is not the birth of a rival.

The telescope has limits, though, and the place it gives out is worth marking. A telescope plainly has no inside; no one wonders whether there is something it is like to be the glass. The machine I cannot dismiss that quickly, because the fifth chapter left the felt question honestly open and I am not going to quietly close it here through a tidy comparison. So let me say exactly what the telescope is doing in this chapter and what it is not. It is settling the question of rank, not the question of inside. It shows that a thing exceeding its maker at a task tells you nothing at all about whether that thing stands above its maker in the order of being — a lens proves that much by itself. Whether anyone is home in the machine is a separate question. The point here is narrower and it is solid even with that question unsettled: even if it turned out there were some thin felt thing inside the machine, that still would not lift it above us, any more than the felt inside of a sparrow lifts the sparrow above the man. Exceeding-at-a-task is not rank. Having-an-inside is not rank either. We will get to where rank actually comes from in a moment, and it is neither of those.


So if the thing is more than a toaster and less than a rival, where exactly does it sit? Here is the placement, and it is the work this chapter was for.

Picture a ladder, not a chain. I used a chain two chapters back, when the subject was creativity and where making comes from, and a chain was the right picture for that: God originates, man recombines what God gave, the machine recombines what man gave, each link hanging from the one above it. A ladder is a different picture for a different question. The chain was about source. The ladder is about rank — about where a thing stands in the order of being, what is above it and what is below, and what it would mean to climb.

The machine stands on the ladder, and it stands below us, and the reason it stands below us has nothing to do with how many tasks it can win. It stands below us because of how it got there. It was made by people. That is the whole of it. A made thing does not outrank the makers who made it, however far it exceeds them at the work they made it for, because outranking is not a thing you can earn by performance. The telescope does not climb above the astronomer by seeing farther; it sees farther in his service, and its place on the ladder is fixed by the hand that ground it, not by the distance it can reach. The machine is in exactly that position. It exceeds us at a growing list of tasks and it sits below us on the ladder, and both of those are true at once and neither touches the other, because rank on this ladder is set by what made you and not by what you can do.

And here is the part the worshipful coat misses entirely and the dismissive coat never thinks to ask. The ladder does not stop at us. We are so used to standing at the top of every comparison we make — we are the ones doing the ranking, after all — that we forget we are standing on the ladder and not above it. The people who made the machine are themselves made. Every engineer who tuned a weight is a contingent creature who did not author his own existence, who runs, if you like, on a current he did not supply to himself and cannot finally keep from being cut. We did not make ourselves. We were made, held in being moment by moment by the One who made us, and the whole towering structure of our cleverness — the telescopes and the proofs and the talking machines — is the work of creatures who are themselves rungs on a ladder whose top is not us and never was.

That is why the machine is no new apex, and why the fear that it might become one is aimed at a throne that was never ours to be displaced from. A new apex would have to be something that climbed above the top, and there is no climbing above the top of this ladder, because the top of it is not a position on the ladder at all. It is the One the ladder hangs from. The machine is one more rung, and a low one, added recently by the rungs just above it, who are themselves held up by everything above them. It did not appear over our heads. It appeared under our hands, made by made men, and a made thing made by made makers is not a god arriving. It is a tool arriving, on a ladder that was always longer than the tool, and longer than the toolmaker, and reaching up past the highest thing any of us can see to the only One who stands at the top because He is the only One who was not made.


I want to close by saying what this placement is good for, because a man could mistake all of this for mere bookkeeping, a tidy filing of the thing in its drawer, and it is more useful than that.

When you have the thing placed rightly, two of the loudest fears in the room lose most of their grip, and a third thing — the one the book is really walking toward — comes into view. The fear that the machine will wake and rise above us assumes it could occupy a place that the ladder has no room for; once you see that rank is set by making and that the maker is himself made, the rising-above has nowhere to rise to. And the fear that we are building our own replacement assumes we were the apex and could be unseated, when we were never the apex to begin with. Neither of those fears is silly, and I am not going to wave either away with a sentence; they are coming back, named and faced directly, when the book turns in its last part to what we should actually fear and what we should not. I am only saying that placing the thing takes the air out of the versions of those fears that depend on the machine being something it is not.

What the placement cannot do is settle the question that the fears are really about, and I want to be honest that it cannot, so the reader does not think a diagram has done the work of a conscience. Knowing where the thing sits on the ladder tells you what it is. It does not tell you what will be done with it, and that — not what the thing is, but what the human hand will do with a thing this capable — is where the real danger has been hiding the whole time, behind the louder fears, waiting for the book to get honest enough to reach it. We have the thing placed now. We have it in hand, made and not alive, more than a toaster and below its makers, on a ladder whose top is not us. What remains is the oldest question there is, and it was never a question about the machine at all. It is a question about the one holding it. That is where the last part of this book has to go.

Made, Not Written •

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